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United States."3 No doubt there is some truth in this estimate also. Lesser
men than Baldwin have occupied all these more glittering positions. Another
reason given is that "to the world he was austere and somewhat forbidding. ' 4
He did indeed seem so to me for a good many years.
Probably the best explanation is the last one given by Professor Jackson:
"Perhaps a final reason for the rapid decline of Baldwin's fame is his lack of
sympathy for many of the movements which were gaining success in his day."
Some of these "movements" took place in the major fields in which he played
a part: education, the judicial development of law, and government policy.
This lack of sympathy is illustrated by his controversy with Theodore Roose-
velt, arising out of a case in which Baldwin had decided that the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act was unconstitutional, 6 a decision later overruled by the
United States Supreme Court7 It is clear that Baldwin did not fully appreciate
the evolutionary process in the development of lav and social mores and the
part played therein by the judiciary. And his blindness was more than simple
dislike of some of the directions in which the evolutionary process was taking
us. There is no doubt that some of the developments that Baldwin disliked are
being discredited in the further process of evolution; but there is no reason to
expect that this will add anything to his fame or stature.
Still, the personality and the accomplishments of Simeon E. Baldwin were
such as to merit fully the present biography. It is brief, it is well-documented,
and it presents a true and interesting picture of an able, versatile and excep-
tionally honorable man.
ARTHUR L. CORBINt
CAPTAIN DREYFUS. By Nicholas Halasz. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1955. Pp. 268. $3.50.
IT was obviously more than accident that turned Nicholas Halasz' attention
to the Dreyfus case. This nineteenth century cause c~l~bre is a good detective
story, but more important it provides a compelling object lesson for our own
security-troubled times.
Alfred Dreyfus was a promising young member of the French general staff
in the mid-eighteen nineties, devoutly loyal to his nation and to the army which
was his life. He was also a Jew. In 1894, at a time when France was suffer-




6. Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 82 Conn. 352, 73 At. 754 (1909). Baldwin
was a Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors from 1893 to 1907, and Chief
Justice from then until his retirement in 1910.
7. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
tProfessor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School.
[Vol. 65
REVIEWS
counter intelligence staff discovered that the Germans had put their hands on
certain French military information. The French intercepted a message from
the German military attach6 in Paris to his Italian counterpart referring to a
"scoundrel D" as the source. They were baffled until a French agent, with
operatic audacity, walked into the German Embassy, snapped up the nearest
document and strolled off with it. By the purest chance this turned out to be a
handwritten but unsigned letter revealing that the writer was delivering certain
military information to the German military attach6. It was destined to become
world-famous as the Dreyfus bordereau.
The French officers concluded that the spy was a member of their general
staff. Assuming a connection between the purloined bordereau and the inter-
cepted message which events later contradicted, they ran through the list of
those on the staff whose names began with D. On the sole evidence of this
coincidence and of the bordereau, which did not identify him but which was
written in a hand that superficially resembled his own, Dreyfus was arrested
and bound over for court martial.
The prosecution relied largely on the bordereau in the open hearings. But
just before the members of the court martial retired for their deliberations, a
representative of General Mercier, Minister of War, casually handed one of
them a small package. It contained the intercepted message, a garbled but in-
criminating biography of Dreyfus and finally a statement to the court by Mer-
cier that the bordereau really had been written by Dreyfus. On this Dreyfus
was convicted and sent to Devil's Island in chains.
With Dreyfus safely away, the general staff breathed a sigh of relief: a scape-
goat had been found. Mercier ordered his incredible note to his inferiors on
the court martial destroyed, but it was not. An article in the press in 1896 re-
ported the use of the secret evidence and almost simultaneously Colonel Pic-
quart, new chief of the counter intelligence staff, discovered the real truth-
that the agent who wrote the bordereau was not Dreyfus but Esterhazy. Doubt
stirred up a movement for Dreyfus' retrial. In answer, the army tried and
acquitted Esterhazy and then arrested Colonel Picquart. The French intelli-
gence staff began to weave about itself a protective web of forgeries to im-
plicate both Dreyfus and Picquart, and the forces of nationalism, church, anti-
semitism and revanche united in agreement that retrial would be an insult to
the honor of the army and so to France. Meanwhile an innocent man re-
mained on Devil's Island.
Of the handful of Dreyfusards, some believed that Dreyfus was innocent.
Others, like Georges Clemenceau, originally believed in his guilt but were
shocked at the patent dishonesty of the procedure used to secure and uphold
the conviction. In their lonely alliance to force revision of the sentence they
emerged as true titans: Zola, whose J'Accuse invited and secured for him a
prosecution for criminal libel; Clemenceau, who wrote over 800 articles in re-
lentless attack on the judgment; the lawyers Demange and Reinach, who
sacrificed their practice for principle; and Scheurer-Kestner, who traded a
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great career in the Chamber of Deputies and his health for loyalty to the
Dreyfus cause.
It was Zola's article that turned the tide. It spread on the record the machi-
nations and intrigues that had created Dreyfus-the-traitor. It named the officers
of army intelligence and the general staff who knew the truth but were ready
to cheat and lie to keep it buried, the politicians who were prepared to stomach
the travesty of the Dreyfus trial for reasons of political expediency, and the
government's minions of easy conscience who could suppress or forge evidence
where the issue was the security of the state. Dreyfus was eventually par-
doned, cleared and reinstated in the army.
Halasz in his retelling of the great affaire scores on all counts. He balances
himself neatly between the facts and the drama. He follows the complicated
thread of the intrigue carefully and patiently. This is no simple hero-villain
yarn: too many participants played leading roles in the Dreyfus case to permit
black and white reproduction. Halasz gives each his due, and still finds time
and space for the flavor of political background. His book is popularized his-
tory at its best.
Halasz does not attempt, either in the text or in the preface, what must have
been a tempting exercise: to draw the analogies and comparisons between our
time and that. In some ways the similarities are strong. Dreyfus was un-
doubtedly innocent. He was convicted of a crime against the state on evidence
that any responsible prosecutor would be forced to admit was flimsy indeed;
evidence, moreover, that was submitted to the court martial in secret. The
accusation was justified, the result defended and the procedure excused on the
ground that it was better to sacrifice the man Dreyfus than to jeopardize the
god Security.
Ironically, too, the interests at stake were trivial. Esterhazy had sold secrets
of no military significance. The issue that wracked the army with dissension,
toppled ministries, inspired duels and paved the way for men on horseback to
ride to brief moments of glory had in reality nothing at all to do with the
security of France.
Furthermore, the plan came within an ace of succeeding because of a short-
lived but virulent attack of national insecurity. Part of France was so intent
on the wounds of the Franco-Prussian War and so fearful of more trouble with
its neighbor across the Rhine that it had little time for concern with individual
innocence, official honesty or effective and serious counter intelligence. The
Dreyfus case began as a spy trial, but it ended in a pitched battle to keep Drey-
fus in prison in spite of his admitted innocence; an expression of a deep
irrational desire to punish some individual for the fears and troubles of the
nation. France paid dearly for the harvest of cynicism, indignation and bitter-
ness that it reaped in these years.
So far this has a familiar ring. The Dreyfus case squarely raised the issue,
which this country is now facing, of the use of undisclosed evidence in pro-
ceedings involving the security of the state. It demonstrated, if ever demon-
stration were needed, the utter impossibility of reconciling such a practice with
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the concept of a fair and decent trial. But the game of analogies can be carried
too far. The Dreyfus case was the single episode of its time. France had sense
enough to expend its energies on one scapegoat. It did not put the machinery
of intrigue to work on a full-scale government loyalty project. Furthermore,
the French contented themselves with charging Dreyfus with an objective
offense: stealing documents. They did not strike on the happy idea of trying
his character. They asked the court martial the simple question, "Did he write
the bordereau ?"-and not "Would he ever, under any conceivable circum-
stances, have been capable of writing it or of associating with someone who
would, or capable of any other kind of disloyalty imaginable ?" (This, inciden-
tally, raises one of the great ironies of the case: Dreyfus would have been a
superb security risk. He was so apolitical he never fully understood the im-
plications of his experience. Had he been anyone but the victim of the affaire
he would not have been a Dreyfusard, according to Clemenceau.)
But it is the Dreyfusards themselves who really make the Dreyfus case
unique. The odds against them were enormous in 1894. The risks they ran
were serious to a degree that is difficult to appreciate now: one of the lawyers,
for instance, was shot and his brief case stolen as he was walking to the court.
Zola would have been lynched by the mobs outside had he not been acquitted
at his trial. Above all the story of the Dreyfus case is the story of their courage.
History will be hard pressed to nominate their equals in our own time.
WILLIAM D. ROGERS tJ
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THIS attractive little booklet invites comment as to both its subject matter
and the circumstances that gave it birth. It comprises a report by a committee
of one of the leading bar associations of New York State, and indeed of the
country, based upon careful research into the operation of the extensive and
involved system of courts of that state. It comes at a crucial time when New
York is once again engaged in a study of its courts looking to the improvement
of the administration of justice. Judicial reform unfortunately does not generate
its own steam. Unless there is some outside stimulus, the ordinary political
forces of a state are not likely to produce changes of serious moment. So the
history of English judicial reform has been a long demonstration of the triumph
of lay pressure over the conservatism of both bench and bar.' And in the more
recent New Jersey reorganization, lay support proved invaluable. 2 But surely
Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. The classic account is Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform,
39 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1926) ; ef. CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 17-21. (2d ed. 1947).
2. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, Reorganication of the New Jersey Courts, 34 CHi. B. REc.
161 (1953).
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